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FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS
HERBERT M. ANDERSON*
IN 1961 JUSTICE FRANKFURTER REMARKED 
in Irvin v. Dowd:'
Not a Term passes without this Court being importuned to
review convictions, had in States throughout the country, in which
substantial claims are made that a jury trial has been distorted
because of inflammatory newspaper accounts .... 2
But jury prejudice resulting from inflammatory newspaper accounts is
not of recent origin. In connection with sensational crimes it has long
been with us. An early case illustrates the problem.' In 1807 the United
States charged with treason one of its most prominent citizens, Aaron
Burr. He was brought to trial in Virginia with Chief Justice John
Marshall sitting as trial judge. Of the first venire of 42 jurors, all but
one indicated an unfavorable opinion of the defendant. Opinions of the
defendant's guilt were based on "newspaper publication."
Justice Marshall clearly perceived the danger of prejudice to im-
partiality:
Why do personal prejudices constitute a just cause of challenge? Solely
because the individual who is under their influence is presumed to have
a bias on his mind which will prevent an impartial decision of the case,
according to the testimony. He may declare that notwithstanding these
prejudices he is determined to listen to the evidence, and be governed
by it; but ,the law will not trust him. Is there less reason to suspect him
who has prejudged the case and has deliberately formed and delivered
an opinion upon it? Such a person may believe that he will be regulated
by testimony, but the law suspects him, and certainly not without
reason. He will listen with more favor to that testimony which confirms
*B.A., University of Oregon; LL.B., Yale Law School.
366 U.S. 717 (1961).
2 Id. at 730.
3 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 76-87 (No. 14,693) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
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than to that which would change his opin-
ion; it is not to be expected that he will
weigh evidence or argument as fairly as a
man whose judgment is not made up in
the case. 4
Marshall's analysis of the effect of prejudice
was lucid but his decision seems more in-
fluenced by a desire for prompt disposition
of the case:
The opinion which has been avowed by
the Court is, that light impressions which
may fairly be supposed to yield to the testi-
mony that may be offered, which may
leave the mind open to a fair consideration
of that testimony, constitute no sufficient
objection to a juror; but that those strong
and deep impressions which will close the
mind against the testimony that may be of-
fered in opposition to them, which will
combat that testimony, and resist its force,
do constitute a sufficient objection to him.
Those who try the impartiality of a juror
ought to test him by this rule.5
Which prejudices of the mind are such that
they will yield to the testimony and which
will resist and combat the testimony? Jus-
tice Marshall does not enlighten us. May
not a juror with any preconceived opinion
of guilt "believe that he will be regulated by
testimony," but "listen with more favor to
that testimony which confirms, than to that
which would change his opinion"? Such
was the opinion of one juror in the Burr
case where the following occurred during
examination of Miles Bott, a prospective
juror:
Mr. Bott-I have gone as far as to de-
clare that Colonel Burr ought to be hanged.
4 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50
(No. 14,692) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
5 Id. at 51.
Mr. Burr-Do you think that such dec-
larations would now influence your judg-
ment? Would not the evidence alter your
opinion? Answer-Human nature is very
frail. I know that the evidence ought, but
it might or might not influence me. . ..
The courts continued to apply Marshall's
doctrine that prejudice does not disqualify
a juror if it can be supposed to yield to the
testimony offered. The burden was placed
on the challenger to show "the actual ex-
istence of such an opinion in the mind of
the juror as will raise the presumption of
partiality."' 7 No test was devised to de-
termine whether an opinion was a "light
impression" or "strong and deep," but by
statute and rule of court it was prescribed
that opinions based on newspaper publi-
cations were not ground for challenge if
the juror swore that he would be fair and
impartial. In Hopt v. Utah," a juror had an
opinion "which it would take evidence to
remove" based on newspaper reports. The
Supreme Court held the juror competent
on the basis of a territorial statute that no
person shall be disqualified as a juror by
reason of an opinion founded upon rumor
or newspaper statements provided the juror
states that notwithstanding such opinion he
will act impartially and fairly.
The constitutionality of the statute was
not challenged in Hopt, but in Spies v.
Illinois,!' it was claimed that a similar Illinois
statute was repugnant to the sixth amend-
ment guarantee of "trial by an impartial
6 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 86 (No.
14,693) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
7 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157
(1878).
8120 U.S. 430 (1886).
9123 U.S. 131 (1887).
jury." There defendants were sentenced to
death after conviction for murder resulting
from a bomb thrown in the Haymarket in
Chicago. The Court noted that New York,
Michigan, Nebraska and Ohio had similar
statutes and that the courts in many states
had adopted a similar rule. Juror Denker's
examination included this testimony:
Q. You believe what you read and what
you heard? A. I believe it; yes.
Q. Is that opinion such as to prevent
you from rendering an impartial verdict in
the case, sitting as a juror, under the testi-
mony and the law? A. I think it is.10
Subsequently, he said that he could render
an impartial verdict based on the evidence
presented in court and the challenges for
cause were overruled. The Supreme Court
held that the statute was constitutional and
that its application did not violate any
constitutional rights of defendants.
The decisions in the above mentioned
cases placed the burden on the challenger
to show that the preconceived opinion of
the juror prevented him from being im-
partial. Regardless of the strength of his
prejudice he was not disqualified if he
swore that he would lay aside his opinions
or prejudice and try the case fairly and
impartially upon the evidence presented
in court. Similar to the question of preju-
dice based upon pretrial publicity is the
problem created by inadmissible evidence
which reaches the jury during the trial from
newspaper reports or otherwise. In Holt v.
United States," members of the jury read
'o ld. at 170.
11218 U.S. 245 (1910).
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the Seattle daily papers with articles about
the case while the trial was going on. De-
fendant was convicted of murder. A new
trial was denied. Justice Holmes held that
the granting of a new trial based on preju-
dice of jurors from reading news articles
was within the discretion of the trial judge
"except in very plain circumstances" which
"the mere opportunity for prejudice" did
not present.
While not expressly departing from prior
rules, the Court began to take a different
approach in 1959. In Marshall v. United
States,'2 defendant was charged with un-
lawfully dispensing dextro amphetamine
sulfate tablets without a prescription. Dur-
ing defendant's trial, reports were published
in two newspapers reporting defendant's
previous felony convictions. The Court
said:
We have here the exposure of jurors to in-
formation of a character which the trial
judge ruled was so prejudicial it could not
be directly offered as evidence. The prej-
udice to the defendant is almost certain to
be as great when that evidence reaches the
jury through news accounts as when it is
a part of the prosecution's evidence.' 3
The case was reversed and a new trial or-
dered although each of the seven jurors who
read the article stated he would not be in-
fluenced by the article, that he could decide
the case only on the evidence of record and
that he felt no prejudice against defendant
as a result of the articles.
In Janko v. United States,14 a new trial
12360 U.S. 310 (1959).
13 Id. at 312.
14366 U.S. 716 (1961).
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was granted when four members of the jury
admitted that they had read prejudicial
news articles. During the second trial a local
newspaper referred to defendant as a for-
mer employee of eastside racketeer Frank
(Buster) Wortman and as a former convict
found guilty in the same case. After the
verdict none of the jurors responded to the
court's question as to whether any had been
influenced by anything other than by testi-
mony in the courtroom. In 1961 the Su-
preme Court reversed the conviction in a
memorandum decision without opinion, ap-
parently considering the case similar to
Marshall.
Within a week after the Janko decision
the Court decided Irvin v. Dowd,', in which
the court cited Spies, Holt, and Reynolds,
for the presumption that
[i]t is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his
impression or opinion and render a verdict
based on the evidence presented in court.1'
But the Court said that such a rule cannot
foreclose inquiry as to whether in a given
case the application of that rule works a de-
privation of life or liberty without due
process of law. Six murders had been com-
mitted in the vicinity of Evansville, Indiana
between December, 1954 and March, 1955.
The crimes were extensively covered by the
news media in the locality and aroused
great excitement and indignation through-
out that county and the adjoining county.
A change of venue was granted but only
to the adjoining county. A second change
of venue was denied. Each juror challenged
15366 U.s. 717 (1961).
16 Id. at 723.
indicated that notwithstanding his opinion
he could render an impartial verdict. In-
diana had a statute similar to the one held
constitutional in Spies v. Illinois." Under
earlier decisions the Court would have
looked no further. But the earlier rules
which had been undermined by Marshall
and Janko were finally abandoned. The
Court said
[n]o doubt each juror was sincere when he
said that he would be fair and impartial to
petitioner, but the psychological impact re-
quiring such a declaration before one's fel-
lows is often its father. * * * With his life
at stake, it is not requiring too much that
petitioner be tried in an atmosphere un-
disturbed by so huge a wave of public pas-
sion and by a jury other than one in which
two-thirds of the members, admit, before
hearing any testimony, to possessing a be-
lief in his guilt.' s
Irvin marked the end of the doctrine that
a juror could purge himself of the effect of
prejudice by declaring that despite his opin-
ion he would try the case fairly and im-
partially based only upon evidence in court.
Two years later in Rideau v. Louisiana,'9
the Court held that in some cases denial
of due process may result from prejudicial
publicity even though no actual prejudice
by any particular juror is shown. Rideau
was arrested following a robbery and mur-
der. The day following his arrest and for
three consecutive days local television
broadcast an interview between the Sheriff
and Rideau which in the Supreme Court
was characterized as "kangaroo court pro-
ceedings .. .presided over by a sheriff,
17 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
18 366 U.S. at 728.
19373 U.S. 723 (1963).
where there was no lawyer to advise Rideau
of his right to stand mute. ' '20 The record
did not indicate the effect of the publicity
two months before trial. Two justices
thought the defendant had not sustained
the burden of showing essential unfairness.
But the majority held that it was not even
necessary to examine the voir dire examina-
tion of the jury to hold "that due process
of law in this case required a trial before
a jury drawn from a community of people
who had not seen and heard Rideau's
televised 'interview.' "21 Rideau and sub-
sequent cases established the doctrine that,
at least in cases of massive and pervasive
prejudicial publicity, defendant does not
have the burden to show any actual pre-
judice as a result of such publicity. Two
years later in Estes v. Texas,22 defendant's
conviction for swindling was reversed as a
result of televising the preliminary hear-
ing and part of the trial. Although "no
isolatable prejudice" was shown the Court
held that in such a case the showing of
actual prejudice is not a prerequisite to
reversal.
Sheppard v. Maxwell 23 likewise held that
the circumstances of that case required
reversal of a conviction despite the absence
of any showing of actual prejudice. Finally,
in that case the Supreme Court made speci-
fic suggestions designed to avoid reversals
based on prejudicial publicity. The Supreme
Court said that the trial court
should have made some effort to control
the release or leads, information, and gos-
20 Id. at 726-27.
21 Id. at 727.
22381 U.S. 532 (1965).
23 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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sip to the press by police officers, witnesses,
and counsel for both sides. 24
The Supreme Court also said that the trial
judge should have warned the newspapers
to check the accuracy of their accounts,
should have proscribed extrajudicial state-
ments by any lawyer, party, witness or
court official which divulged prejudicial
matters; the court should have requested
city and county officials to promulgate a
regulation with respect to dissemination of
information about the case by their em-
ployees.
Finally, the Court said that collaboration
between counsel and the press as to in-
formation affecting the fairness of the
criminal trial is not only subject to regula-
tion, but is highly censurable and worthy
of disciplinary measures. 25
Following the directions of the last sen-
tence, bar associations and the Judicial
Conference of the United States have
adopted rules designed to regulate the re-
lease of prejudicial information which may
influence the outcome of a trial.
During the last decade not only the
courts, but also many bar associations were
giving attention to this subject. News media
and media organizations likewise focused
attention on this subject. Some cooperated
with bar organizations, but many feared a
threat to freedom of the press, and pre-
sented varying degrees of opposition. The
Judicial Conference of the United States
in 1964 approved proposed legislation
which would have made it contempt of
24 Id. at 359.
25 Id. at 363.
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court for parties or their attorneys to make
available for publication information which
was not filed or admitted as evidence in the
case.
26
The Attorney General of the United
States on April 17, 1965, promulgated
rules entitled "Release of Information by
Personnel of the Department of Justice
Relating to Criminal Proceedings.
' 27
Many Massachusetts newspapers and the
Massachusetts Broadcasters Association
adopted the "Massachusetts Guide for the
Bar and News Media" in 1963.28
In 1963 the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York appointed a Special
Committee on Radio, Television and the
Administration of Justice. In 1965 it issued
its Interim Report, "Radio, Television and
the Administration of Justice: 'A Docu-
mented Survey of Materials.' " In 1967 it
published its Final Report With Recom-
26 REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 84-85
(1964) (regarding S. 1802, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
and S. 290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.).
27 28 C.F.R. § 50.2. All major federal agencies
working in criminal enforcement have adopted
these rules which are popularly known as the
"Katzenbach Rules." See Hearings on S. 290
Before the Subcommittees on Constitutional
Rights and Improvements in the Judicial Ma-
chinery of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 42 (1965).
28 Reprinted in Appendix D, Tentative Draft,
Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press,
American Bar Association, 1966. This is the
report of the Advisory Committee on Fair Trial
and Free Press to the Special Committee on
Minimum Standards for the Administration of
Criminal Justice of the American Bar Associa-
tion. Honorable Paul C. Reardon of the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court was Chairman of the
Advisory Committee (hereinafter the Reardon
Report).
mendations entitled "Freedom of the Press
and Fair Trial."'29
In 1964 the President's Commission on
the Assassination of President Kennedy
said that Oswald's right to a fair trial was
seriously jeopardized by the indiscriminate
reporting and recommended that represen-
tatives of the bar, law enforcement agencies
and the news media work together to
establish ethical standards to insure a
proper balance between the rights of a free
press and the right of individuals to a fair
trial.3 0
Later in 1964 the American Bar Asso-
ciation appointed its Advisory Committee
on Fair Trial and Free Press to participate
in its project on Minimum Standards for
Criminal Justice. In December, 1966, this
Committee published its 265-page report
on Standards Relating to Fair Trial and
Free Press. Its Final Draft was approved
by the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association in February, 1968.
In February, 1965, the American News-
paper Publishing Association appointed a
Special Committee on Free Press and Fair
Trial. In January, 1967, it published its
report entitled "Free Press and Fair Trial."
In September, 1966, the Supreme Court
of the United States directed the lower
courts to adopt rules to control prejudicial
publicity. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, the
Court said:
29 Often referred to as the Medina Report after
the Chairman of the Committee, Honorable
Harold R. Medina.
30 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY 239
(1964).
The courts must take such steps by rule
and regulation that will protect their pro-
cesses from prejudicial outside interfer-
ences.
31
Following the Supreme Court's directive
the Judicial Conference of the United
States in September, 1968, recommended
that the district courts adopt rules of
court to implement Sheppard v. MaxwellA2
The first rule recommended in the Kauf-
man Report would prohibit lawyers from
releasing information on prior criminal
record; confession, admission or statement
of the accused, or failure of the accused
to make a statement; performance of ex-
aminations or tests or the failure to sub-
mit to examination or test; identity,
testimony or credibility of prospective
witnesses; possibility of plea of guilty; or
any opinion as to the accused's guilt or
innocence. Not precluded from announce-
ment are identity of the accused, requests
for assistance in obtaining evidence, assis-
tance in apprehension of the accused or
warning to the public of any dangers he
may present. 33
31 384 U.S. at 363.
32 Report of the Committee on Operation of the
Jury System, Judicial Conference of the United
States, Honorable Irvin R. Kaufman, Chairman,
published September, 1968 (hereinafter the
Kaufman Report).
33 The recommendation is as follows:
It is recommended that each United States
District Court adopt a rule of court regulating
public discussion by attorneys of pending or
imminent criminal litigation, and that this rule
contain substantially the following:
It is the duty of the lawyer not to release
or authorize the release of information or
opinion for dissemination by any means of
public communication, in connection with
pending or imminent criminal litigation with
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The second rule proposed would pro-
hibit all courthouse personnel, including
which he is associated, if there is a reasonable
likelihood that such dissemination will inter-
fere with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice
the due administration of justice.
With respect to a grand jury or other pend-
ing investigation of any criminal matter, a
lawyer participating in the investigation shall
refrain from making any extrajudicial state-
ment, for dissemination by any means of
public communication, that goes beyond the
public record or that is not necessary to in-
form the public that the investigation is under-
way, to describe the general scope of the
investigation, to obtain assistance in the ap-
prehension of a suspect, to warn the public
of any dangers, or otherwise to aid in the
investigation.
From the time of arrest, issuance of an
arrest warrant or the filing of a complaint,
information, or indictment in any criminal
matter until the commencement of trial or
disposition without trial, a lawyer associated
with the prosecution or defense shall not re-
lease or authorize the release of any extra-
judicial statement, for dissemination by any
means of public communication, relating to
that matter and concerning:
(1) The prior criminal record (includ-
ing arrests, indictments, or other charges of
crime), or the character or reputation of
the accused, except that the lawyer may
make a factual statement of the accused's
name, age, residence, occupation, and family
status, and if the accused has not been
apprehended, a lawyer associated with the
prosecution may release any information
necessary to aid in his apprehension or to
warn the public of any dangers he may
present;
(2) The existence of any confession, ad-
mission, or statement given by the accused,
or the refusal or failure of the accused to
make any statement;
(3) The performance of any examina-
tions or tests or the accused's refusal or
failure to submit to an examination or test;
(4) The identity, testimony, or credibility
of prospective witnesses, except that the
lawyer may announce the identity of the
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marshals, clerks, bailiffs and court re-
porters, from disclosing information not
victim if the announcement is not other-
wise prohibited by law;
(5) The possibility of a plea of guilty to
the offense charged or a lesser offense;
(6) Any opinion as to the accused's guilt
or innocence or as to the merits of the case
or the evidence in the case.
The foregoing shall not be construed to pre-
clude the lawyer during this period, in the
proper discharge of his official or professional
obligations, from announcing the fact and
circumstances of arrest (including time and
place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of
weapons), the identity of the investigating and
arresting officer or agency, and the length of
the investigation; from making an announce-
ment, at the time of seizure of any physical
evidence other than a confession, admission or
statement, which is limited to a description of
the evidence seized; from disclosing the nature,
substance, or text of the charge, including a
brief description of the offense charged; from
quoting or referring without comment to pub-
lic records of the court in the case; from
announcing the scheduling or result of any
stage in the judicial process; from requesting
assistance in obtaining evidence; or from
announcing without further comment that the
accused denies the charges made against him.
During the trial of any criminal matter,
including the period of selection of the jury,
no lawyer associated with the prosecution or
defense shall give or authorize any extra-
judicial statement or interview, relating to the
trial or the parties or issues in the trial, for
dissemination by any means of public com-
munication, except that the lawyer may quote
from or refer without comment to public
records of the court in the case.
After the completion of a trial or disposi-
tion without trial of any criminal matter, and
prior to the imposition of sentence, a lawyer
associated with the prosecution or defense
shall refrain from making or authorizing any
extrajudicial statement for dissemination by
any means of public communication if there
is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemina-
tion will affect the imposition of sentence.
Nothing in this Rule is intended to preclude
part of the public records of the court. 34
The third rule proposed would in sensa-
tional cases, permit on motion of either
party, or on its own motion, a special or-
der governing extrajudicial statements by
parties and witnesses.3 5
During the last decade the Supreme
Court has viewed in a new light juror preju-
dice resulting from prejudicial publicity.
Attempts of the legal profession to prevent
the formulation or application of more restric-
tive rules relating to the release of informa-
tion about juvenile or other offenders, to
preclude the holding of hearings or the lawful
issuance of reports by legislative, administra-
tive, or investigative bodies, or to preclude any
lawyer from replying to charges of misconduct
that are publicly made against him.
Kaufman Report at 22-26.
34 It is recommended that each United States
District Court adopt a rule of court prohibiting
all courthouse personnel, including among
others, marshals, deputy marshals, court clerks,
bailiffs and court reporters, from disclosing to
any person, without authorization by the court,
information relating to a pending criminal case
that is not part of the public records of the
court. Such a rule should specifically forbid the
divulgence of information concerning argu-
ment and hearings held in chambers or other-
wise outside the presence of the public.
Kaufman Report at 29.
35 It is recommended that each United States
District Court adopt a rule of court providing
in substance as follows:
In a widely publicized or sensational case,
the Court, on motion of either party or on
its own motion, may issue a special order
governing such matters as extrajudicial state-
ments by parties and witnesses likely to in-
terfere with the rights of the accused to a
fair trial by an impartial jury, the seating
and conduct in the courtroom of spectators
and news media representatives, the man-
agement and sequestration of jurors and
witnesses, and any other matters which the
Court may deem appropriate for inclusion
in such an order.
Kaufman Report at 30-31.
such prejudice at its inception have caused
concern among numbers of the news media
that the right to a free press may be im-
paired. Lawyers are well aware that no
right guaranteed by the Bill of Rights is
paramount. Neither the right to free press
nor the right to a fair trial should be al-
lowed to infringe upon the other. While
laying down rules to prevent judicial pre-
trial publicity, the Supreme Court in
Sheppard took care to point out that free-
dom of the press should not be restricted. :6
The Medina Report, the Reardon Report
and the Kaufman Report each emphasizes
that freedom of the press must not in any
way be restricted by the equally important
right to a fair trial. Lawyers and judges
fully recognize that the right to a free press
and the right to a fair trial are conjunctive
and not alternative.
No attempt is being made to restrict
reporting of court proceedings for "what
transpires in the courtroom is public prop-
erty."'3 7 The objective is to prevent the
36 "This Court has, therefore, been unwilling to
place any direct limitations on the freedom exer-
cised by the news media .. " 384 U.S. at 350.
But in State v. James Earl Ray, No. 16645, Crim-
inal Court of Shelby County, Tennessee (1969),
relying on Sheppard the trial court held in con-
tempt a reporter who published statements by
defendant's counsel and his investigator on the
grounds that they had actual knowledge that the
attorneys and their investigators were forbidden
by order of court from making extrajudicial
statements about the case. The trial court held
that "all persons who aid and abet those against
whom an injunction has been rendered in dis-
obeying it, are guilty of contempt." (Sept. 30,
1968).
37 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350,
quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374
(1947).
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premature release of information which
may be inadmissible at the trial and which
may cause irreparable injury. While re-
maining on the alert, the press has by and
large been cooperating. The reporting of
the tragic death of Senator Robert Ken-
nedy in 1968 is in marked contrast to the
news handling at the time of the death of
President Kennedy in 1963.
Many media organizations have cooper-
ated with bar associations in formulating
guidelines to assist their reporters. Crime
news can be fully covered and at the same
time the rights of the defendant can be
protected. An example of the joint efforts
of the legal profession and the news media
is contained in the guidelines adopted by
the Oregon News Publishers Association,
Oregon Association of Broadcasters and
Oregon State Bar in 1968. It is as follows:
OREGON
GUIDELINES FOR DISCLOSURE AND
REPORTING OF INFORMATION
ON CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
It is generally appropriate to disclose or
report the following:
1. The arrested person's name, age, res-
idence, employment, marital status and
similar biographical information.
2. The charge.
3. The amount of bail.
4. The identity of and biographical infor-
mation concerning both complaining
party and victim.
5. The identity of the investigating and
arresting agency and the length of the
investigation.
6. The circumstances of arrest, including
time, place, resistance, pursuit and
weapons used.
It is generally not appropriate to dis-
close for publication or to report prior to
the trial the following:
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1. The contents of any admission or con-
fession, or the fact that an admission
or confession has been made.
2. Opinions about an arrested person's
character, guilt or innocence.
3. Opinions concerning evidence or argu-
ment in the case.
4. Statements concerning anticipated testi-
mony or the truthfulness of prospective
witnesses.
5. The results of fingerprints, polygraph
examinations, ballistic tests or labora-
tory witnesses.
6. Precise descriptions of items seized or
discovered during investigation.
7. Prior criminal charges and convictions.
PHOTOGRAPHY
1. Photographs of a suspect may be re-
leased by law enforcement personnel
provided a valid law enforcement func-
tion is served. It is proper to disclose
such information as may be necessary
to enlist public assistance in appre-
hending fugitives from justice. Such
disclosure may include photographs as
well as records of prior arrests and
convictions.
2. Law enforcement and court personnel
should not prevent the photographing
of defendants when they are in public
places outside the courtroom. However,
they should not pose the defendant.
Many bar associations throughout the
country are presenting seminars for the
benefit of the members of the news media
to discuss recent court decisions concern-
ing prejudicial publicity. The courts can
reverse and direct a new trial if prejudicial
publicity has prevented a fair trial but "re-
versals are but palliatives; the cure lies in
our remedial measures that will prevent
the prejudice at its inception. ' :3s
Knowledge concerning the nature of the
material which may result in reversal will
cause many members of the news media
to voluntarily withhold publication of that
material until the accused has had a trial
free from such prejudicial matter. Lawyers
and the bar associations should on a regu-
lar and continuing basis carry on dialogues
with news media and conduct seminars for
the information of reporters.
The American Bar Association's Legal
Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and
Free Press under the chairmanship of Judge
Edward J. Devitt of St. Paul, Minnesota,
is urging bar associations and news media
to jointly study the problem and agree
upon guidelines which will preserve both
the right to a free press and the right to a
fair trial. With the cooperation of the legal
profession and the news media, crime news
may be appropriately reported without in-
fringing the right to a fair trial. As Time
magazine put it, "If the pres$ and officials
respond as they should, the idle gossip
pieces that slur a defendant should be
eliminated without real impairment of the
public's right to know. ' '39
38 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363.
39 Free Press v. Free Trial, 91 Time 64, 67
(March 1, 1968).
